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Movement 1: Introduction 
 Musical works are mysterious things. In our everyday speech, we talk about Beethoven’s 
Fifth Symphony, The Beatle’s “Yesterday,” and Miles Davis’ “So What” as if they are 
uncontroversial, clearly defined entities. But, when one considers what these entities are like, 
they become obscure. Two of the most troubling problems with musical works are that, while, 
for example, Beethoven’s Fifth seems to exist, it does not exist at any particular place or time, 
and that, while any instance of a work is a physical thing, the work itself does not seem to be a 
physical thing. Two of the most common approaches to analyzing a musical work, in light of the 
preceding problems, are known as musical Platonism and musical Nominalism, with Platonism 
being the more commonly accepted of the two. In this paper, I will demonstrate why Platonism 
does not solve the problems it purports to solve and I will defend a version of musical 
Nominalism which draws influence from a view known as musical Materialism, a phrase coined 
by Chris Tillman (2011). 
 To begin, I will give an overview of the two views with which we shall be concerned, 
giving the Nominalist approach a somewhat broader explication in order to contrast the 
Nominalism with my own. Musical Platonists, broadly speaking, take two central claims to be 
true. The first is that a musical work is type, which defines it as a category or a class. The second 
is that musical works do not come into existence. Since physical things are not types and come 
into existence, it then follows that musical works are not physical. They must instead be extra-
spatiotemporal objects of some kind; they are abstract objects in the sense Quine would use1. 
This approach to analyzing a musical work bears a strong resemblance to the Forms of Plato’s 
 
1 That is, an extra-spatiotemporal object. There are other senses of the term “abstract object,” which will 
be discussed later. 
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ontology, which is why the view is called musical Platonism2. On the face of it, this seems 
absurd. Surely, there was a time before which Chuck Berry’s “Johnny B. Goode” did not exist 
and after which it did exist. Even if we construe this broadly by realizing that, if a work is just an 
instantiation, there is no definitive time at which “Johnny B. Goode” came into existence, there 
are certainly points in time at which it did and did not exist. For example, it did not exist in 1860 
and it did exist in 1960. So, “Johnny B. Goode” must have come into existence, through one 
means or another, at some time between those two dates. This much seems obvious to the point 
of triviality. However, the Platonist can respond, I think with some force, that our notion of a 
musical work being “created” or “coming into existence” is wrapped up in vague language, and 
that the notion of “creation” and “discovery” in relation to music is much more muddled than 
one may care to admit. Kivy (1987) problematized our standard notions of “creation” and 
“discovery” by pointing out times throughout history, such as Pythagoras’ realization of his 
titular theorem, in which there is not a clear distinction between an act of creation and an act of 
discovery. One may be tempted to say that Beethoven created his numerous symphonies, but it 
seems wrong to say that Pythagoras created his theorem. 
 According to its supporters, musical Platonism also has the benefit of having a strong 
explanatory power. One problem all theories of musical works must combat is the problem of 
how performances, especially imperfect performances, can be said to be relate to the work. 
Musical Platonist, following in the long line of Platonic philosophies before it, claims that the 
work is an extra-spatiotemporal object and all performances of the work bare a relation to it, 
albeit imperfectly in a great number of cases. This relation is similar to the way Plato envisioned 
his forms relating to the objects inhabiting the physical world. For example, all birds, red things, 
 
2 Indeed, any view in ontology called “Platonist” typically means that the view posits extra-spatiotemporal objects. 
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and small things partake in the forms of “the bird,” “redness,” and “smallness.” From this, it is 
easy to see how a musical Platonist can make sense of performances. Let’s supposed we have 
two performances of Chuck Berry’s “Johnny B. Goode,” the performance that was eventually 
released as a single and a performance at the first show of a cover band with a tumultuous 
internal dynamic. For the musical Platonist, both performances are of “Johnny B. Goode” 
because they both partake in the sound structure, that is, the way the notes relate to each other, 
both in terms of pitch and rhythm, of “Johnny B. Goode;” one performances just happens to 
partake more completely in the sound structure of “Johnny B. Goode.” 
 ‘Seems,’ however, can be a dangerous notion. Often, when we say ‘seems,’ we are 
making reference to some intuition we have. Intuitions, however, can be faulty. One clear 
example of this is that we intuitively take the world to work in more or less the way Newton 
described it in his physics. However, as Einstein showed with his theories of relativity, the world 
does not, in fact, work in the Newtonian sense; at best, Newton’s physics is an approximation of 
the way the world actually works. With that said, Platonism’s alternative, musical Nominalism, 
tries to sooth some of the peculiar implications that our intuitions can drive us toward. However, 
I would like to make a quick note about nomenclature. In many philosophical topics, especially 
in philosophy of music, I find that “Nominalism” is an ill-fitting title. At its most extreme, 
Nominalist world views claim that the thing in question exists only as a linguistic agent (hence 
the name “Nominalism,” which literally means name-ism). This is not the view of a musical 
work I wish to advance. However, another form of Nominalism claims that abstract objects, of 
the kind mentioned above, do not exist. This can then be coupled with the positive claim that all 
that exists are physical things. This form of Nominalism about musical works is what I shall 
defend and, following Tillman (2011), I will call it musical Materialism from here forward. I 
Charles Crumpler 5 
 
make this change in jargon for two reasons. The first is that I hold that a position’s name should 
positively say what it holds to be true, even if it is in an abridged form. ‘Nominalism’ fails at this 
because it makes a claim about what does not exist, extra-spatiotemporal objects, as opposed to 
what it (or, at least, I) does claim to exist, namely, material objects. The second reason is that, as 
previously mentioned, the term ‘Nominalism’ has two related but distinct meanings which can 
easily get confused. In response, I am trying to move toward terminological clarity and say 
explicitly that what a musical work is is a physical thing. With that said, why not musical 
Physicalism? Some philosopher draw a distinction between materialism and physicalism. Could 
this not cause more confusion? I am skeptical that it will because, while the views can be seen as 
distinct (I happen to uphold the distinction), with some using materialism to refer only to 
questions in the Philosophy of Mind, while Physicalism is the broader metaphysical theory. I 
tend to uphold the following line of thought: a theory is a Materialist theory if it claims that some 
domain of discourse is explainable in entirely physical terms. For example, one could be a 
Materialist about minds or musical works or universals. However, a materialist view does not 
necessarily imply that everything is physical. One could be a dualist about minds but still be a 
musical Materialist.3 A Physicalist, on the other hand, is someone who claims that the only 
things that exist are physical things. By this definition, Physicalism is the sum of all 
Materialisms; if you are a Materialist about everything that exists, you are then a Physicalist.4 
Even more, I find that the term ‘musical Materialism’ has a stylistic weight to it that ‘musical 
Physicalism’ does not. I admit that this has more to do with taste and a personal appreciation for 
 
3 With that said, I am not certain how an idealist could be a materialist about anything, but that, I confess, comes 
more from my lack of familiarity with idealism than it does from an incompatibility between the two. 
4 Perhaps I should say, “about everything that actually exists,” lest any realists concerning possibilia decide to 
mount an objection. 
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poetry rather than detached adherence to the (loose) rules of philosophical nomenclature, but I 
think the benefits of choosing a more poetic name outweigh the potential costs. 
 With that digression on nomenclature aside, one might rightly ask the question of what a 
musical work is if it is not an abstract object. There are several different views one can take. For 
example, one can be a type theorist, much like the Platonist, but hold the view that the types are 
spatiotemporal entities rather than extra-spatiotemporal. This view, which might be called an 
Aristotelean approach, is similar to the way D. M. Armstrong treats universals. Equally, one can 
take a trope theorist approach and claim that each instance of a piece exhibits the trope of 
musical form A for whatever song is being heard at the time. However, it is more common to 
view a musical as a set of performances, with the criteria for set membership changing from 
theory to theory. Goodman, for example, claimed that a performance must be accurate to be 
included in the set (1976). 
 I would like to pause here to draw a distinction that will be important later. Several times 
thus far, I have made mention of abstract objects. In contemporary jargon, “abstract object” 
refers to an object that exists outside of space and time. This usage is often attributed to Quine, 
who viewed abstract objects as extra-spatiotemporal objects. For Quine, sets and universal, if 
they exist, are abstract objects (Quine 1980). However, there is another possible meaning for the 
term ‘abstract object’ that is not often used in philosophy. I will call this the Williamsonian 
usage because I derive this meaning from D. C. William’s ‘abstract particulars.’ For Williams, an 
abstract particular is a particular thing that has been removed from its context. He uses the notion 
to promote a trope theory of universals, in which a red apple is red because, when its redness is 
viewed apart from its being in the apple, we can refer to it as “red,” even though it is “the red of 
the apple” (Williams 2018). In this way, an abstract object in the Williamsonian sense is an 
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object that has been removed from its context and analyzed on its own; it has been abstracted, so 
to speak. This distinction will become important later. 
Movement 2: An Attack on Platonism 
 As presented previously, musical Platonism seems like a coherent viewpoint that has 
exceptional explanatory power. With this I must agree. Many philosophers have gotten a great 
deal of explanatory mileage out of musical Platonism, which is admirable. Equally, that I can 
see, there is nothing blatantly contradictory about musical Platonism. The problem I find with 
musical Platonism, and the points that I will argue against, are the arguments used to promote 
Platonism. To be specific, I will attack two common arguments used to motivate a Platonic view 
of music. The first will be the argument presented by Kivy described above. The second is an 
argument against a Materialist view for which the Platonists seem to be able to provide a clear 
and simple response, which I shall explain shortly. I will start with Kivy’s argument. 
 The conclusion to Kivy’s argument is that there is what we, in ordinary language, call 
creation can, in many cases, be paraphrased as discovery. He gives three examples in order to set 
up an analogy: of Pythagoras and his titular theorem, of Mozart’s composition of Don Giovanni, 
and of Edison’s invention of the lightbulb. Of the third example, he paraphrases Edison’s 
invention, a creative act, as his discovery of how to produce light from electricity. However, his 
example of Pythagoras and the Pythagorean Theorem seems to be of an altogether different 
caliber. Kivy admits openly that the way we talk about mathematics tends to Platonize it, but 
even taken from a non-linguistic approach, their does seem to be something unique about 
mathematics when it comes to discussions of discovery and creation. Unless one takes an 
instrumental approach to mathematics, it seems ridiculous to say that the Pythagorean Theorem 
did not exist, if not in writing, at least in concept before Pythagoras showed that the square of the 
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hypotenuse of a right triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides. Even 
more, the Platonic approach to mathematics has been the favored approach among 
mathematicians for centuries. Many mathematicians view numbers, geometric figures, sets, and 
other mathematical objects as Quinean abstract objects. However, when dealing with abstract 
objects, we must be very careful that we are not confusing a Williamsonian abstract object for a 
Quinean abstract object. In the case of mathematics, this confusion is often made. A perfectly 
clear picture of mathematics can be created that treats mathematical entities as natural states or 
properties of objects that are abstracted from the objects. To bolster this claim, consider an 
argument made by Charles Pinter, a professor of mathematics at Bucknell University. He claims 
that abstraction is a common part of human interaction with the world, claiming “[n]ature 
presents us with a myriad of interwoven facts and sensations, and we are challenged at every 
instant to single out those which are immediately relevant and discard the rest” (Pinter 1990, p. 
19). He gives the example of physicists, who create abstractions from natural events like force 
and velocity and “find laws which govern these abstractions” (ibid.).  
 The same can be said about mathematical objects. There does not exist a real triangle in 
the world. There are very close approximations, but no real triangle, because objects in the world 
do not lineup neatly or maintain their length for very long. If, by random chance, a perfect 
triangle was to exist, it would almost immediately be bent out of shape by the little fluctuations 
in atomic and subatomic movement. This does not, however, preclude us from studying triangles 
as an abstract object in the Williamsonian sense. That is, an object which has been abstracted 
from its context with certain individualizing characteristics removed and other universalizable 
characteristics held constant for analysis; it would be the “perfect” triangle, so to speak. What 
characteristics are kept and which are removed depends on why we are abstracting and is 
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determined largely on pragmatic grounds. The fact that certain features of our world follow the 
patterns of abstract objects seems to follow from the local regularities of our universe’s particular 
geometry and not, as the Platonist would propose, from extra-spatiotemporal entities. Put simply, 
mathematics does not need to rely on Quinean abstract objects because it can be done with just 
as much rigor, clarity, and efficacy with Williamsonian abstract objects. Because mathematics 
can be constructed without the need for Quinean abstract objects, Kivy’s argument by analogy 
loses a great deal of its force. However, the other argument, often posed against Nominalist and 
Materialist views against music, could, on the face of it, give the Platonist more ground on which 
they may stand. 
 The problem, which is known as the inheritance problem, goes as follows. Because 
musical Materialist accounts of a musical work require that the work be made up, in some way, 
of its performances, the “work[] inherit[s] all of the features shared by all of [its] (proper) parts 
or concrete manifestations” (Tillman 2012, p. 252). It then follows that, if every performance of 
The Rite of Spring contains wrong notes, then The Rite of Spring contains wrong notes. This 
premise is justifiable because, in practice, no performance is going to follow a score correctly 
because there will always be small imperfections in the notes or melody played. More often, 
however, the mistakes are not going to be simply “small imperfections.” However, as the 
opponent of musical Materialism claims, The Right of Spring does not contain wrong notes. 
Consequently, musical Materialism leads to a contradiction. Since neither of the other premises 
is false, musical Materialism must be false. It is here the musical Platonist may enter. By 
construing the musical work as a Quinean abstract object, the musical Platonist can say that, 
while each of the performances of The Rite of Spring contains wrong notes, The Rite of Spring, 
the abstract object, does not. 
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 Put simply, this is another powerful argument by the musical Platonist that could 
convince even the most stubborn musical Materialist. It does, however, have its own problems. 
While the musical Materialist may have an inheritance problem, on the same token, the musical 
Platonist has an accounting problem. Consider this example: imagine Pink Floyd performing 
“Shine On You Crazy Diamond.” There is no doubt that it would be immaculate. The famous 
guitar riff that, in many ways, exemplifies the song goes like this: 
    . 
I shall call this performance “SOYCD.” Along with the band, however, many guitarists, both 
professional and novice, have played this riff, either in a full performance, in demonstrating the 
riff, or in learning the song. In those many imitations of Pink Floyd, however, at least one 
guitarist has likely played        
  
instead of the correct notes. I shall call this performance “SOYCD0.” For those who cannot read 
sheet music, the SOYCD goes Bb – F – G – E, while SOYCD0 goes B – F – G – E. If we assume 
musical Platonism is true, how does SOYCD and SOYCD0 relate to “Shine On You Crazy 
Diamond?” Do they exemplify the same musical work or are they different works? The Platonist 
can answer in one of two ways. They can either answer that they both exemplify “Shine On You 
Crazy Diamond,” but one does so to a lesser extent than the other. This, however, opens up 
questions of how an instance of a work relates to the work itself, which, at present is rather 
mysterious. Another possible answer is that SOYCD relates to “Shine On You Crazy Diamond” 
while SOYCD0 relates to a different work, let’s say “Shine On You Crazy Diamond 0.” 
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However, these are not the only ones, as there are many different places throughout “Shine On 
You Crazy Diamond” where one band member could make a single mistake. For example, if we 
assume, for every second, that one of the four band member makes a mistake while playing 
“Shine On You Crazy Diamond” and no one else makes a mistake for the rest of the 
performance, there are over 6,000 different “Shine On You Crazy Diamond”s. If we allows for a 
greater number of mistake combinations, the number of possible “Shine On You Crazy 
Diamond”s surpasses what a person can reasonably be asked to conceive of in any meaningful 
sense. Remember that, for this version of musical Platonist, each of these mistakes corresponds 
not to the abstract object “Shine On You Crazy Diamond,” but to an object very similar, though 
different from, “Shine On You Crazy Diamond.” When this theory is applied to every song, the 
number of abstract objects, many of which would likely be left without a corresponding 
performance (at least in the actual world), multiplies to numbers that are, from a practical 
standpoint, incalculable. 
 Neither of these arguments are knock-down arguments against musical Platonism. Nor do 
I intend them to be. They do, however, exemplify some of the motivational problems of musical 
Platonism. The first demonstrates that the creation to discovery translation, as purportedly 
exemplified by mathematics, does not actually hold for mathematics, which brings into question 
whether it holds for music. The second shows that the musical Platonist is either committed to 
entities that are not fully describable, and are, consequently, questionable, or that are far more 
numerous than many anticipate. With these problems in place, one wonders whether a more 
parsimonious theory can be concocted. 
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Movement 3: A Description and Defense of a Musical Materialism 
 To begin this section, I would like to make a few observations. The first is that any 
particular performance of a musical work is a physical thing extended in space and time. The 
second is that, as the musical Platonists have shown, abstract objects are power tools for 
grouping objects under a single banner. With that said, we need not confine ourselves strictly to 
Quinean abstract objects. But, first, let us look at how performances, and physical things in 
general can relate to one another. I would like to propose that the thing that makes two 
performances of the same work is their sound structure. It is important to stress that pitch and 
rhythm are both relative in this case. Assuming the ratio between the frequencies of the pitches 
and the note durations are the same, it is absurd to assert that two performances are different 
works just because one was played in a different key or a few beats per minute faster than the 
other. This is not novel; Kivy holds this view (1986). However, unlike Kivy, I do not think there 
needs to be recourse to extra-spatiotemporal entities to analyze a musical work. Instead, we can 
look at the physical effects of a performance. Because any performance is a sound structure and 
sound is a physical thing (in this case, atoms and molecules together moving as a wave at certain 
frequencies) and physical things have physical effects, it then follows that a performance has 
physical effects, namely the effect of the sound on the things around it, including any persons 
present. If a person hears, for example, the guitar riff for “Shine On You Crazy Diamond” and is 
familiar with the song, they will recognize it. If they hear a full band performance of “Shine On 
You Crazy Diamond,” even if the riff is played wrong, they will recognize it as “Shine On You 
Crazy Diamond” with an inaccurate guitar riff. Why is this? The total effect of the music is very 
similar between the perfect and imperfect performances. Remember that perception of sound is 
caused by soundwaves hitting the ear drum and sending a signal to the brain. Similar 
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performances sound similar because they vibrate the eardrum in similar ways. Furthermore, the 
reason they vibrate the eardrum in similar ways is because they have similar sound structures. 
 But, one might ask, what does it matter that two sound structures are similar? It matters in 
the same way that two right-angled objects being candidates for the application of the 
Pythagorean Theorem matters. Because the sound structure is similar, we can compare 
performances of a musical work by thinking of the work as a Williamsonian abstract object, that 
is, an abstraction from a particular performance with certain aspects held constant. One might 
ask, I think rightly, on what grounds we hold certain aspects constant between two performances. 
For this, I reference similarity. We know two pieces can be very similar, say a full band 
performance containing SOYCD and another, almost identical full band performance containing 
SOYCD0. They are, in fact, as similar as two performances can be without being note–for–note 
equivalent. However, the work is not restricted to only these two performances. There are other 
performances that are very close, but that differ in different ways. We must also take those 
performances into consideration. In short, a musical work is a Williamsonian abstract object 
constructed on the grounds of its various performances. It is in this way that this theory can be 
called musical Materialism, because it posits that the work is composed from its concrete 
performances. 
 While this definition is workable, it does have a major problem. Comparing two things 
and looking for similar features can be useful for setting a basis for many things, but, to be 
useful, we also need certain limiting criteria. Consider the Mad Hatter’s question “why is a raven 
like a writing desk?” Many have put forth answers to this question, each of which hint at some 
similarity between ravens and writing desks. However, there is an inherent problem in posing the 
question this way. The Mad Hatter has not given any indication of which features of the raven 
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and the writing desk we should be concerned. The question is too open ended. This is not a 
problem for the Hatter or for Lewis Carroll. The question is posed as a riddle, something that is 
supposed to make you think both critically and whimsically and open up new avenues of 
thought. But, when we are in a philosophical discussion about comparisons, certain limiting 
terms need to be put in place because we are trying to get to the bottom of the question, not 
merely pose cute riddles to one another. 
 With that said, let us consider the spread of performances that actually exist. We know 
that the performances are comparable in numerous different ways, so let us focus specifically on 
sound structure. When we do this, the problem becomes much simpler because, while there are 
many different actually existent sound structures, they tend to form clusters of similarity with 
gaps between those clusters; it is these clusters that are the “work,” so to speak. One can draw a 
comparison to color. The colors exist on a spectrum from dark red to violet with many different 
colors in between. However, our color perception groups the spectrum into different categories. 
Certain colors are easily distinguished from one another while other are more similar. When I 
speak of clusters in similarity, I mean it in the same way “green” can refer to a cluster of colors, 
from lime green to pine green. Similarly, when I speak of gaps, it is in the same way there is a 
gap between green and red and green and blue. Clearly, green is closer to blue than it is to red. 
So to with sound structures. Most pop songs are closer to each other structurally than they are the 
works of Tchaikovsky; recently, songs that are aggressively similar have led to legal disputes. 
When it comes to the performances of songs, however, these gaps are often much more 
pronounced than they are in the colors. Two songs that have the same chord progression and 
even the same rhythm will have different embellishments, different melodic lines in the song. It 
is on those grounds you can set up limiting cases. 
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 One may ask who or what determines which Williamsonian abstract object, which 
cluster, deserves the title of “the” musical work. Surely, a work has certain features that do not 
change, regardless of how many people play it inaccurately, and someone or something must 
determine what counts as definitive. As intuitive a position as this may seem, I do not think it is 
warranted. It is worth remembering that, for most of human history, music existed primarily as 
folk songs, passed from person to person through an aural tradition. Indeed, many great songs in 
the modern canon are public domain folk songs for which a single definitive version does not 
exist. Consider the song “House of the Rising Sun,” which fits the previous description. If you 
were to survey the population, the version most would call the definitive version would be the 
cover by the Animals. This is not, however, what I mean by definitive. While the Animals’ cover 
of “House of the Rising Sun” is the most popular version, it was neither the first nor last cover. 
Bob Dylan, for example, recorded a cover that preceded the Animals’ version. The only reason 
the Animals’ version is seen as definitive is because it is the most popular. However, when 
looking for a metaphysically definitive version of a musical work, there simply is not one; or, put 
more accurately, as intuitive as it may seem, we have no reason to believe that there is one, 
which, until the evidence suggests otherwise, is sufficient reason to not believe there is one. 
Movement 4: Coda 
 At the outset of this essay, I pointed to two problems that a theory of musical works need 
to address: that a work seems to exist, but not at a particular place and time and that, while the 
instances of a work seem to be physical things, the work does not. Throughout the previous 
section, I hinted at how a cluster approach can settle these issues, but I will make the answers 
explicit. The cluster approach denies the assumption of the first problem in that it denies that the 
work needs to be at a particular place and time to exist. This may seem like an absurd 
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conclusion, but, on inspection, most things deny this assumption. Consider, for example, the 
Roman military. Being an entity composed of many persons deployed across Europe, Africa, and 
Asia, it did not exist at a particular place and existed at varying sizes across time. Yet, we would 
not say that the Roman military did not exist simply because it could not be definitively and 
unambiguously located. Even more, the notion of a thing existing at a particular place and time 
could be suspect, depending on the conditions one uses to specify what constitutes a place and 
time. In many cases, places and times are much more gerrymandered than we would care to 
admit. Equally, in saying that a work is a similarity cluster of its physical performances, the 
cluster approach denies that a work is nonphysical.5 
 One thing that may bother the reader is how do we determine between possible 
performances that seem to be between two clusters; what do we do with performances found in 
the gaps, so to speak? To answer this, I shall provide a few examples. First, I find it unlikely that 
anyone would try to claim similarity between the sound structures of performances of “Row, 
Row, Row Your Boat” and a death metal song. The similarities would be so minimal in terms of 
the melodies, harmonies, and rhythms used that the comparison would not be useful. This is an 
extreme example, but, in more modest forms, the same general approach will separate a good 
majority of songs from one another. In instances where a performance is close enough to two 
clusters to cause concern, I would suggest a holistic approach to the appraisal of the offending 
performances. More specifically, I would suggest looking to the clusters and asking what minute 
details in the performance can push it one way or the other. Suppose two clusters are structurally 
identical except in the middle eight, where the first bar of one begins with a B in the main 
 
5 Perhaps one could argue that the clusters are not physical. However, I cannot think of any way this argument could 
be constructed, since the parts of the cluster are all physical and there does not seem to be anything above and 
beyond the cluster. 
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melody and the first bar of the other begins with a D in the main melody. The controversial 
performance features a C#. Depending on the key of the songs and the chord voicings used prior 
to and in the section of the song, the performance can be grouped into one cluster or the other 
based on the way the C# works in the song from a music theoretical standpoint. If even this does 
not succeed in bringing clarity, I would recommend, as a means of settling the controversy, a 
pragmatic approach, namely how will the inclusion of the performance affect the nature of each 
cluster. Specifically, consider how the performances inclusion in one cluster or the other could 
affect future decisions in determining where an ambiguous performance lies. If, after all this, the 
performance is still unresolved, it may be worth considering that it is different enough from its 
two closest clusters that it is, in fact, a cluster all its own. 
 To conclude, I would like to make some remarks on a notion employed throughout this 
essay: similarity. As a relation, similarity seems at once very familiar and very strange. I have 
noted previously that similarity between two things is always context dependent; two things must 
be similar in some way. Given this, one could write a similarity relation as S(a, b, F), where a and 
b are subjects and F is a predicate. Given the nature of similarity, one can see that, under normal 
circumstances, it defines an equivalence class, since it is reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive. 
However, similarity is not a strictly logical relation, as there is a lot of flexibility in how strictly 
or how loosely we restrain the predicate F. This is not a great problem for the cluster theory, 
since it implies a looser notion of similarity, given the great many ways in which performances 
of the same work can differ, but it is why I saved any talk of classes until now. The precise logic 
of similarity is a topic shrouded in mystery, precisely because it is so imprecise. But, for the 
present, the loose notion at play in the cluster theory is sufficient to provide a strong contender 
for a theory of musical works. 
Charles Crumpler 18 
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